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PREFACE

I went into history because I wished to undertake the
comparative study of revolutions, and to see if I could
learn what historians had to say about· revolutions, and not,
when I came· to do

t~is

thesis, to discover that I had

nothing new to contribut·e. I did not wish to overlook
differences of perspective, such as that of a scientific
rationalist·and of a revolutionary.marxist.

After all, what

is the use of comparative historiography if all that it does
for.you is enable you to talk with some plausibility about
events that changed the world, without also understanding
how those events were viewed,. and if such understandin.<s
does not enable you to contribute to the understanding of
others?
My understanding of revolutions evolved from first
reading the classic in comparative study of revolutions,
The Anatomy of Revolutions, by Crane Brinton, and then·
reading Eric Hobsbawm's speech, "Revolution," which includes
four significant claims:

I
I·

1. ·rhis· is the epoch of social revolution.
2 •. Revolutions are inevitable.

J. Revolutions are uncontrollable.

4. Revolutionaries are of little historical interest.I

l

I

Hobsbawm's claims are not supported by the bulk of findings

derived from my understanding of three abortive revolutions.
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INTRODUCTION
Statement of Purpose.·rhe purpose of this thesis is to desc-ribe and then

to compare common descriptive characteristics (uniformities)
evident within three historical events: the Paris Commune of

1871, the Zapatista Movement of the Mexican Revolution between·
1910 and 1919, and the Spartacist Rebellion of 1919.

One

such uniformity is the fact that all three are abortive
social revolutions.
Of course, the historian must begin with what he finds.
The fact that some revolutions are abortive refutes the
universal generalization that all revolutions are successful.
The semantic usage of the term "revolution" must be
conside.red.

Hobsbawm' s preference for a "steam-boiler"

analogy of revolution, ·insofar as it fails to support his
claims, :1.s considered in reference to Brinton's "fevertt
analogy.2

Hence, a difference in perspective is introduced

by way of examination of the views of Crane Brinton, a

scientific rat1onalist3 ,· and of Eric Hobsbawm, a marxist of

the Old Left.4
The uniformities drawn from the comparative study of
the three abortive.revolutions suggest all four of Hobsbawm's
claims are refutable.

a secondary aim,

i.e.,

Hence, the purpose of this thesis has
the refutation of his four claims.

History of the Idea of "Revolution"
1. Astronomic Sense. The term "revolution" was
originally used in the astr?nomic sense when Copernicus
in

1543 wrote De revolutionibus orbium caelestium. His use

of the term explained celestial movements, such as the orbit
of planets, where motion returns to its starting point. This
origlnal astronomic ·sense of. the.term "revolution" was later
applied to socio-political events, since such events seemed
analogous to the motion of planets •.~
Renaissance historians -- e.g., Guicciardini, Nardi,
and Machiavelli -- applied the term rivoluzione, which is
1

the Italian equivalent of the Latin term revolutionibus, to
events either of political disorder or change in rulership.
In 166() the English equivalent, "revolution," was used in
Clarendon's History of the Rebellion when speaking of the
"many and great revolutions" in the preceding twenty years
in England.

Significantly, the astronomic sense was retained

in the early use of the· term in English..

Clarendon, for

example, attributed governmental changes in England to the
influence of an evil star.

Thomas Hobbes also retained the

astronomic sense -- but without the evil star -- when he
wrote Leviathan, where he wrote of the governmental ch..anges
taking place in England: "I have seen in this revolution a
circular motion of the .sovereign power through two usurpers
from the late King to his son."6
2o The Non-astronomic Sense. Herodotus and Thucydides

knew of course of uprisings against rulers; Plato and

3
Aristotle knew of changes of constitutions; Cicero knew of
people eager for new things; Polybius and Aristotle knew of
historical cycles in politi·cal forms; and many of these same
writers living in pre-Copernican times are often translated
as having known the non-astronomic sense of the term "revolution," as in the case of one translator who has Plato observing in the Republic that

11

revolutions" start wlthin the

ruling class7 or as in the case of the translator who has
Aristotle observing in Politics the .-state of mind of those
who create "revolutions."8
What is meant whenever the term "revolution" is applied
to socio-political events in the non-astronomic sense?

The

circularity of motion has.evidently dropped out of what the
term

one~-·

had meant in the astronomic sense.

What is retained

whenever the term is applied to socio-political events depends
solely on the user o·f the semantlc device.

As a u..l1.iversal,

the term "revolution" is a semantic device without any single
definition.

Peter Amann finds that the term needs a re-

definition.

Crane Brinton finds that the term has a general

usage.

Indeed, Brinton dismisses the need for an "exact

definition of 'revolution'" but says he will "cling to the
general term9," while Eric Hobsbawm defines "revolutionary
situation" as offering "good chanqes of a revolutionary outcome. "lo

He leaves open. what he would consider "a revolu-

tionary outcome":

"Except insofar as 'failure' implies a

definition of 'success', this leaves the problem of the outcome of revolutions openo" 11 Thus, he leave it open.

Also,

lJ.
Hobsbawm seems to say that "success" is more than merely the
establishment of state power or its equivalent.
Obviously, a reyolutionary situation can have either

good chances of a revolutionary outcome or not.
establishment

of _-·a

Only after

state power or its equivalent can those

chances be assessed as good or bad with any_degree of historical exactitude.

Indeed, it is unhistor1c to predict

whether chances of a revolutionary outcome are good or bad.
Hence, Hobsbawm is not too helpful in arriving at a conoise
definition of the concept of revolution.
In contras·t, Crane Brinton, who deals w1 th the Paris
Commune of 1871 as an "abortive"·revolution, is historical
and therefore more helpful.

For example, he says, "By

abortive is meant simply the failure of organized groups in
revolt." Slnce the three revolutions to be considered failed
to establish state power or its equivalent, the term "abortive" applies to all three cases.
The Communards under such leaders like Gustave Flourens,
the Zapatistas under the leadership of Emiliano Zapata, and
the Spartacists under leaders like Rose Luxemburg each as an
organized group failed to overthrow the respective incumbent
governments and then to establish their own state power or
its equivalent.

How did they fail?

In each case the cause

was similar: 1.e., the respective incumbent governments used
effective force to smash each insurgent group.

Part of that

use of effective force was the assassination of the respective insurgent leaders mentioned above.

B. Revolution to a Scientific Rationalist.
Historians need conceptual schemes in order to ulnderstand revolutions.· Crane

B~inton's

conceptual scheme is

that .of a scientific rationalist with a detached disposition.
His classic study, The Anatomi of Revolution, ·has the modest
aim of attempting to establish, "as a scientist might•

certain first approximations of uniformites to be noted in
the course of four successful revolutions in modern states.•~
In

contrast~

2

this study· analyzes three unsuccessful modern

revolutions.
Brinton finds one relevant uniformity in all four
successful revolutions he compares: the respective·rulers
did not use . force

effe~t 1 vely.

He says, the' "determined use

of force on the part of the government might prevent the
mounting excitement from culminating in an overthrow of the
government~u

But "in all four their attempt was a failure.n13

In contrast, in all three abortive revolutions here studied
the incumbent government did effectively use force.

Part of

the determined use of force of all three r·espective incumbent

governments was the use of assassination of insurgent leaders.
The ·common uniformity of assassination may become the pattern
in the future to effectivel! control revolutionary situations.
The theme that Brinton stresses is that of understanding
revolutions in order to protect ourselves against them.14 He
finds a parallel between understanding thunderstorms and
understanding revolutions: 1.e., in both cases steps can be
taken to protect ourselves against them.

6
In order to understand how to protect ourselves from
revolutions, if that is our intention, Brinton offers the
conceptual scheme of a scientific rationalist, who uses
inductive facts that are empirically verifiable about pheno-

mena·to support tentative hypotheses.

He aims at establish-

ing first approximations of uniformities.by comparing the
course of four revolutions, i.e, the American, English, French,
and Russian reyolutions. This thesis has a similar aim: 1.e,,

to analyze the common descriptive characteristics (uniformities) by comparing the course of three abortive revolutions.
J

Some historians draw the distinction between science,
which deals ·-with approximate uniformi tes that are similar and
therefore not unique,.and history, which deals
-- with human events that are un1.que.
distinction.

they claim

Brinton rejects this

He says, "the doctrine of absolute uniqueness

of events in history seems nonsense.»15

Since uniformities

are limited generalizations, it would seem to follow that
uniformi~ies

are types of common characteristics.

Thus,

specific, particular characteristics of events are typical,
i.e., insofar as particular events are similar and therefore
of a type, they are''not unique.

A specific revolution may at first seem to be singularly unique in all particulars, but these same type of
particularities lose their uniqueness when compared to
similar particularities common to other revolutions upon

comparison.

Such uniformities, however, ought to retain

the limitations of the inductively drawn generalizations.

c.

Revolution to a Marxist of the Old Left.
In August
197 5,. Eric Hobsbawm spoke on "Revolution"
.
.

at the Fourteenth International Congress of Historical
Sciences.

Although he does not claim professional expertise

in the fields of marx1st ideas and of the history of revolutions and revolutionary movements, he is regarded
as a marxist of the Old Left.

Since

t~e

~enerally·

concluding arguments

in this thesis attempt to refute four claims that he makes in
his speech, the stress will be on elaboratiQ.n of those
claims.
a~y..

This attempt at refutation of his claims is second•

But it will help to understand revolutione.:ry 'chances •.
Hobsbawm's four claims are basically the [ollowing:

1.

'
'

1. This is the epoch of social revolution.
2. To accept this as the epoch of social revolution
is to recognize that revolutions are· inevitable.
J. These revolutions are uncontrollable.
4. Revolutionary personality is of little historical·
interest.
Retaining the same numbers as the claims, he states them as
follows in the more extended elaboration of context:
1. Historical analysis of modern times as an "epoch
of social revolution" is profitable. ·
1. We are following Marx, who "provided the most
powerful guide to revolution," which nwe may call the
macro-phenomenon ~·of 'an epoch of social revolution.'"
1, 2,3. To accept Marx's analysis of modern period as
"an epoch of social revolution" 1s "to recognize that at·
certain periods specific kinds of drastic historical change
are inevitable, and that therefore historic forces beyond
the control of will, must 'break asunder the integum•- of ·
the old systems •••• "
2. 11 • • • there can be no serious dispute that some functionally revolutionary changes have been inevitable, some _
.actual revolutions a.voidable, because avoided, •••• "
2. " ••• his (Marx's) beliaf."in the inevitability of violent revolutions was qualified - he allowed for the possibility of a peaceful transition in some countries •••• "

2. It is a disadvantage 0 to assume that no revolution
is in the long run inevitable."
2. & 3. "I specifically wish to disclaim as unhistorical any version of the view that 'revolution is always
avoidable if •••• t"
J. "••• changes by revolution are likely to be ••• (initially) ·.:more uncontrollable, •••• "
). "This (Lenin's analysis of the revolutionary situation) suggests that a revolut1onary situation is not a crisis
controllable, at least from within, by deliberate policy or
•crisis-management', being characterised by relative uncontrollability ...
3. ,.I agree with Dahrendorf who rightly finds the
analogy of the steam-boiler more illuminating than Brinton's
'fever' (analogy)"
4. " ••• though approaches which seek to identify •••
•revolutionary personality' are of little historical interest,
• • • • nl6

These statements can be restated in different ways, but the
four claims are basically reducible to the paraphrasing above.
Only an extended argument will refute these four claims.
But such an argument can be here simply put as foilows: The
assassination of key insurgent leaders with a high level of
control over both the insurgent movement and the revolutionary situation has greatest impact on changing the.course of
history and in particular controlling the revolutionary situation. In order to determine the amount· of impact of the
assassination of a particular revolutionary personality, the
historian has no recourse but to show more than a little

interest in the revolutionary personality.

Assassination

plots in defense of the state presume that the revolutionary
situation can be controlled (and sometimes avoided, if predicted) by the use of determined effective force.

Any

revolutionary situation that is controlled or avoided proves
that revolutions can be controlled and therefore are not

9
inevitable.

Examples of abortive revolutions refute the

claim that all. revolutions are inevitable.
a revolutionary

Indeed, during

i.e., one that has the possibi-

situation-~

lity of a.revolutionary outcome -- it is unhistoric to speak
of those possibilities before they occur.

Only after the

revolutionary outcome can Hobsbawm or any historian speak
of the historical inevitability of the chances of success.
Most of Hobsbawm•s notions are -- e.g., "inevitable,"
"chances," "outcome," and "success!' -- future-bound possibilities which are blatantly unhistoric.
Consider, for ·example, the claim that any successful
revolution is uncontrollable.

The success of a revolution

cannot be forecasted with any degree of historical exactitude.
To claim that all successful revolutions are inevitable also
cannot be asserted with any degree of historical exactitude.
To define revolutionary situation in unhistoric, future-

.

bound terms is to reduce the concept of revolution to the
semantic games that historians play: 1.P:, a revolution is
· successful when state power is established or its equivalent, but only after it is established, while a revolution is
controlled -- if it is ever controlled by the incumbent state
power by the effective use of force -- before its equivalent
is .established.

Hence, the claim that any successful (future-

bound) revolution is uncontrollable (past-bound) is self-contradic~ory,

because a given

~evolution

cannot be both in the

future and in the past at the same time.
The term "avoidable" makes Hobsbawm self-refuting:

10
All social revolutions are unavoidable.
Some social revolutions are not unavoidable.

No social revolution is avoidable.
Some· social revolutions are avoidable.
The former is an example a particular negative proposition
opposed to its general positive counterpart.

Hobsbawm does

claim that.social revolutions are uncontrollable and 1nevitable.

But he refuted himself by also suggesting that some

revolutions are avoidable, 1.e., not unavoidable.

And the

latter is an example of a particular positive proposition
opposed to its general negative counterpart.

Hobsbawm, it

must again be pointed out, does claim that social revolutions
are uncontrollable and inevitable, which is to say that no
social revolution is controllable and not inevitable.

But

his claims are again refuted by his own suggestion that some
revo·lut1.ons are avoidable.
The introduction of the term "successful" is in keeping
with Hobsbawm's own understanding of revolution.
is either a failure or a success.

A revolution

But it cannot be considered

a failure unless "success" is de:fined: "Except insofar as
'failure' implies a definition of •success'," Hobsbawm says,
"this leaves the problem of the outcome of revolutions open."
He goes on to say,
Obviously the establishment and maintenance of state
power or its equivalent is a minimum condition of success,
but success is more than this unless the objects and functions
of a revolution are defined merely as the ·establishment of
state power where previously none existed ••••
Thus, when he speaks of revolutions as inevitable, he is
speaking of successful revolutions as being inevitable.

CHAPTER I

DESCRIPrION OF THREE ABORTIVE REVOLUTIONS
A. The Paris Commune of 1871.

The Paris Commune of 1871 -- not to be confused wit.h
the Paris Commune of 1793 and· the Paris Commune of 1848 -is regarded by Karl Marx,

v.r.

Lenin, and Rosa Luxemburg

as the best model of a proletarian revolution that established a·programme for working-class political power. As
an abortive revolution the Paris c·ommune of 1871 is also
a

practical model for anti-marxists ·concerned in protecting

the state's monopoly of power.
The following description of the Paris Commune will
stress the revolutionary personality of Gustave Flourens.
Related to his personality as a leader of the Paris Commune
is the death sentence in absentia issued by the incumbent's
military court, which provides· the sort· of evidence needed
to prove that the incumbent government considered Flourens
a key insurgent leader of the Paris Commune.

His later

capture and assassination after leading one of the major

Communard assaults against Versailles must be seen in
relation to the

anti-Com..~unard

myth created by the incumbent

government in terms of the moral righteousness of the
determined use of force; including assassination.
The opportunity for the rise of the Paris Commune

occurred when Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's liberal Empire was

12

cut short by losing the Franco-Prussian War of 1870~ . He had
suffered three defeats in six days· in August of 1870, when
demonstrations broke out in Paris against his Empire.

On

September 2, 1870, he surrendered himself and his .army. With
the collapse of the Republic in the person of Napoleon III,
there no longer existed a legitimate government to rule. On
September

~'

insurrectionary demonstrations broke out in Paris.

That night a Central Committee -- dominated by flourens and

17

other revolutionary personalities -- began.considering
elections, national defense, and provisioning of the city.
Jules Favre, foreign minister for the Government of
National Defense, spoke to Bismarck, who would not negotiate
I

with a government which did not represent the whole of France.

I
I
I

The group led by Favre sought peace, while the republican·
insurgents in Paris prepared to defend Paris against the
Prussians, who completely encircled Paris

by

September 18,

the beginning of a long siege that was to unite Parisians.
Meanwhile, Favre and Ad61phe Thiers, on behalf of the
·incumbent . government, prepared to seek an armistlceo
During the· months of the siege, the Pa.r1s National
Guard made several abortive revolutionary attempts to overthrow the provisi'onal government.

The Central Committee of

the Twenty Arrondissements (iee., neighborhood power centers
or communes, which are forerunners of the Soldiers' and the
Workers' Councils -- or "soviets" -- of the Russian Revolution

and of the German Revolution of 1918)

1ssu~d

a pro-repub-

11can ttRed Poster" on January 7, 1871, seeking t;o replace

.

(
(

I
I
I

.I

lJ.
the provisional government with a Paris Commune.
On January 28, the provisional government finally
signed an armistice with the newly proclaimed German Empire
under Bismarck.

The signing of the armistice gave Favre and

Thiers a favorable role in French politics, especially
the elections to a National Assembly, which designated
Thiers as

0

Head of the Executive Power."

Reaction to the pro-monarchist. . National. Assembly was
to again unify Parisians.

The International, the Federation

of Trade Unions, and the Delegation of the Twenty Arrondissements sought working-class polltical power and worker
ownership of means of production, if they ever gained control
of Paris.
On March 10, the National Assembly transferred its
seat to Versailles and then passed several decrees, each
of which angered Parisians.

It ended the mo:ratori.um on

rents and payment of commercial bills; it abolished pay for
members of the National Guard; and it suspended six prorepublican newspapers.
Flourens, one

o~

·And a military court directed that

the two most popular revolutionary leaders,

receive a death sentence in absentia._18

By March 17, Thiers, seeking the respect of the Germ.ans
as well as the rest of France, sought to demonstrate his
government's control over Paris.

He sent troops to Paris

with the orders to seize the National Guard's cannon. But
the troops bungled their orders and Parisians soon gathered
and fraternized with them.

"A mob brought together by

14:
chance;J.9 that morning murdered two of Thiers' generals,
Lecomte and

Cl~ment-Thomas.

Neither the National Guard,

nor the Central Committee, were responsible for the murders.
Nevertheless, Thiers and the National Assembly propagated
the myth that these crimes were deliberate acts of the
National Guard in defiance of the "le.gal". government of
France, although as soon as Thiers made the fateful. decision
on March 18·to withdraw all regular troops and government
officials from Paris to Versailles, Paris suddenly lacked
a "legal" government.
Parisians were first enraged;by Thiers' attempt to
take thei.r cannon -- because the cannon in question had been
paid for by public subscriptions and they considered them not
state property but their own -- and then surprised by Thiers'
abandonment of Paris.
vocation of Thiers.

All the talk in Paris was of the proA political vacuum had been created in

Paris, which was now lacking a "legal" government.

Auguste

Vacquerie, who was Victor Hugo's son-in-law and a pro-republican dramatist, used the funeral of Hugo's son, who had been
killed in the Franco-Prussian War, as the occasion to proclaim the democratic social Republic. And soon barricades
.

~

were up everywhere in Paris and the red flag flew over the
Hotel de Ville tower.20
A Paris Commune was declared.

And soon communes were

proclaimed in Lyons, Marseilles, Toulouse, Narbonne, St.
Etienne, Le Creusot, and Limoges.

Thus, Paris was not an

isolated centre of republican sentiment.
i

I

!

i ·

15
Members to the Paris Commune were elected on March 26.
Its membership has been carefully analyzed by historians
with great interest in order.to identify whether

th~

Paris

Commune' s revolutionary personalities were prolet.arian,
since the

0

socialist myth" holds that the pro-republican

programme of the democratic social Republic was pro-working
class.

The proletarian political power base of the Commune

can be considered a practical model, if its membership can
be identified as working class..

Of the membership, ·17

members were of the International, 13 of the Central Committee· of the National Guard, 8 members of Blanquists, 10
"
members -- including Gustave
Flourens -- of the Radical Press
and Revolutionary Party, 21 members of the Clubs, and

15

members of the bourgeoisie, who did not sit or else res1gned.
The Communards numbered 100,000

and the elected members
listed above were the Commune's leadership. 21 .
One of the first acts of the Commune was .to renew

.war-time moratoriums on rents and extend payment of commercial bills.

The next act was an anti-cleric decree that

separated Church from State.

Later acts included giving

to the workers the means of production, 1.e., vacant shops.
And a "Declaration'' of the Commune proclaimed its intentions:
••• Paris and the entire nation must be informed of the
character, the motives and the aims of the revolution that
is taking place at this moment1 it must be known that those
who are ultimately responsible .for our sorrows, our sufferings and our misfortunes are the same who, after betraying
France and delivering Paris to foreigners, proceed to
destroy the capital with a blind and merciless determination,
so that the two-fold evidence of their betrayal and their
crime may perish with the downfall of the Republic and of
freedom.22

16
The Communards themselves in the midst of a revolution
blamed all the sufferings of Parisians on Versailles, which
was depicted as mercilessly determined to destroy Paris.
Of the Commune's elected leadership, Gustave Flourens
was regarded as a high-minded radical revolutionary with
Jacobin sentiments.

He was not,

ho~ever,

because he was independently wealthy.

a proletarian,

Yet he had been

elected to the Commune from the Twentieth Arrondissement.
The fact that the Versailles' military court had singled
him out, along with.Blanqui; _to be sentenced to death in
absentia -- since he had been one of the major revolution-

i.

aries in the earlier insurrections in 1870 -- made him a
hero to the Commune.

A measure of his role as Communard

leader is seen again when he led the abortive sortie of
April 3, 1871, against Versailles.

It was one of the first

and last attempts to overthrow with force the Versailles
government..
l

Since he had been condemned to death and since

he was captured during the sortie, it comes as no surprise

I

l

i
!

:I
i

.

I!

that the political murder of Flourens thereafter took place.
Flourens had gone to battle against an adversary with

l

all the ardor of great heroes.

l ·

After his assassination,

the Communards had a martyr in the person of Flourens.
Thereafter, Thiers prepared to attack- Paris with
loyal troops.

Bismarck gave him captured French troops.

On May 21, 1871, Thiers' troops breached the walls of Paris.

From May 21 to 28 street fighting took place. · Between
15,000 and J0,000 Parisians were killed.

Thousands were

17
later deported.

In order to support the. moral righteous-

ness of the assassination of Flourens, the slaughter of
Communards and their sympathizers, and mass deportations .
. to New Caledonia,

Th~ers

flooded F!ance.with misleading

pamphlets which slandered the dead.

Thus, a "reactionary

myth" was created that aimed at propagating an ant11nsurgent climate ·1n France in order to restore law and
order.
Pro-Communard socialists propagated a "socialist myth"
of the Paris Commune, which became the model for marxists.

23
.
One historian has found three myths of the Paris Commune:
(1) The reactionary one, successfully launched by Thiers
even before the Commune was elected; this myth links Blanqui
with Buonarotti and Babeuf of the last revolution of the
French Revolution and accuses 1 t of being the

instr~nt

of

communists of the International and atheists, whose attacks
on both property and the Church were labeled deplorablee (2)
The socialist one, supported by Marx and later Lenin, emphasizes the spontaneous and popular nature of· the Commune,
e.g., rather than a premeditated outbreak; this myth links
the International and.believers in the Communist Manifesto
-- with its programme for the Revolutions of 1848·-- to the
Communards and their proletarian programme.

And (3) the

revolutionary one, inspired by Lissagaray' s famous his.tory,
Commune of 18Zl (which was translated by Marx's daughter)
and the memory of Charles Delescluze, who was killed on the
last barricades as a 1793 republican.
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Certainly one of the roles of a historian must be that·
of an iconoclast, since only historical fact can break the
fabricated myth. Consider the "socialist" myth which almost
romanticizes the Paris Commune.
"The Paris Commune of 1871

Crane Brinton says that

i~

an abortive social, though
hardly socialist, revolution. 024 Karl Marx in 1881 said that
" ••• the majority of the Commune was in no sense Socialist •••• ,25
In order for the "socialist" myth to hold, the members Of the
elected officers had to be socialist workingmen, but "The
majority· or the elected officers consisted not of workingmen
but of journalists, . club orators, ~nd.:what Marx himself
called 'shouters.• 026 And the International, which was
socialist, was not marxist.

One delegate, Leo Frankel, was

the only marxist in the French·section of

the·Inte~national.

Since "the majority of the leaders of the Paris Commune were
not members of the French Section of the Internat.iona1,r•27
the historian must look elsewhere for the possibility of
justifying the myth that the Communards were "socialist.n
The National Guard might be considered the only possibility·
of a majG'.rity of workingmen.

But "There is no real evidence

extant that the majority of the National Guard consisted of

i
I

~

wo~kingmen,
.

although this is not unlikely, given the nature

of the Paris population, the large numbers of unemployed,
and the guaranteed pay. 0 28
Nevertheless,

v.r.

Lenin in State and Revolution calls

the Paris Commune "the first attempt of a proletarian revolution to break !!.Ethe bourgeois state machinery •••• 1129
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And official Soviet views generally agree with I. Stepanov
who wrote in Parizhskaya Kommuna (Moscow) in 1921 that the
Paris Commune "was socialis.t because the proletariat can
fight for no other gause than Socialism."30
Much of course is made of the correspondence between
Marx and Frankel, the jewelry worker.
;.
i

.

Since Frankel both

knew Marx and was a member of the French section of the
Internation~l,

a degree of believability is given the

ttsocialist" myth.

Moreover, the "reactionary" myth feeds

on the acceptance of the "socialist'' myth, because Thiers
claimed that the Paris Commune. was ·a "redtt revolution.
After the fall of the Commune, many Communards left
France ·ror England, where they met Marx and some became
what could be termed "marxists. 0

Lissagaray, however, was

too autonomous a revolutionary personality to be the
follower of Marx.

Lissagaray, visiting the Marx household,

formed an attachment with Eleanor Marx, who spent some of
her time -- when not flirting with Lissagaray

-~

trans-

lating 500 pages of his present-tense history from French
to English.31
Lissagaray's evaluation of Gustave Flourens included:
Flourens, chief .of the 6Jrd battalion, but who was
the real commander of Belleville, coul4 no longer res·train
himself. With the head and heart of a child, an ardent
imagination, guide_fu by his own impulse, Flourens. conducted
his battalions ••••
Obviously Flourens must be considered almost a revolutionary
hero, since nothing could restrain him in conducting his
insurgent leadership role, which was guided by

autono~y.
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An autonomous revolutionary personality is not controllable
from without because he does not recognize any legitimacy
of authority.

The ardent spirit of such a leader is more

like a "fever" than a steam-boiler. (Indeed, a steam-boiler
is controllable.

A "fever" is a healthy s.tate of either the

state or the individual.
can be cured.

But with understanding a "fever"

A.fever usually takes a period of time to

cure, while a steam-boiler can be controlled instantly and
continuously.)
In·order for Eric Hobsbawm to find the "steam-boiler"
analogy more "right •t. than Crane Brinton' s ''fever" analogy,
the

·~steam-boiler"

claims.

analogy must correlate with his four

How is a revolution like a ''steam-boiler"?

In the

mechanical sense, the steam-boiler is instantly and continually controllable.

If revolutionary sit·uations are not

controllable as· Hobsbawm claims, then the "steam-boiler••
analogy does not support his claim, because it is indeed
controllable.

If a revolution is not initially controllable.,

then a "steam-boiler" must be initially uncontrollable, which

.i .

is not the case •
Moreover, Eric Hobsbawm's claim that approaches that
seek to identify.revolutionary personality are of little
historical interest does not serve the historical need to
show evidence as to whether the Paris Commune was "socialist"
or "proletarian."

The historian must seek the evidence

needed to adequately support his ela1m with such an approach •.
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B. The Mexican Revolution and Zapata between 1910 and 1919.
In order. to describe the Zapatista Movement (i.e.,
the guerrilla movement of the peasants in Morelos, south of
Mexico City, led by Emiliano Zapata), it is necessary to
describe other revolutionary events in the north.

The stress

will be placed on key revolutionary leaders, the habits of
obedience of Zapatistas to Zapata and of V1111stas to Villa
-- rather than to the federal government -- and the
plurality of political murders (i.e., assassinations) during
the Mexican Revolution.
\

I

In September 1910 Mexicans celebrated their lOOth year
of independence.

September was also the 80th birthday of

Mexico's dictator, Porfirio D!az, who had ruled for 30 years.
During D!az's dictatorship, he had brought both stability and
material prosperity to Mexicoo
rich, fat, relaxed, and old.

His generals and· judges were
Landowners, clergy, army,

intelligentsia, and even bandit chiefs -- i.e., all possible
opposition to his rule -- were converted into followers of
the dictator.
Bandits were hunted down and given the choice of either
joining D!az or dying.

Those who did not surrender were

pursued and then killed by the very bandits who had accepted
government pardons.

Thus, peace was achieved by making the

bandit the symbol of authority in Mexico .33
All segments of society, except the Indian peasants,
were considered vital to D!az's monopoly of power.

For
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the loyalty of .the army was assured by allowing generals
unlimited opportunities for graft, including haciendas as
gifts, collecting pay for regiments where only platoons
existed, and granting of concessions for gaming houses and
brothels. Even

~he

loyalty of the Catholic Church was

ensured by granting them universal influence over the Indian
population as well as access to great wealth and power as
landlord, banker, and trustee.

In return, the Church

preached obedience to D!az.
Thus, D!az was almost without opposition.

He announced ·

that he favored political opposition in the presidential
election of 1910.

One candidate, Francisco Madero, a member

of a rich, landowning family in northern Mexico, presumed
that the elections would be free.

Since his campaigning in

Sonora brought out large crowds, he was arrested
until after the elections.

~nd

jailed

Then the results were announced:

196 votes for Madero and millions for D!az.
Madero, after his release,·denounced the.election as
a fraud in his famous "Plan of San Luis Potos!," which
launched the Mexican Revolution.

Pascual Orozco and Pancho

Villa in the north and Emiliano Zapata in the south answered
this call to revolution against the dictatorship of D!az.
But Madero soon found that he could not control Orozco and
Villa.

Orozco, with 1500 effectives under his command, felt

that Juarez, a city near the United States-Mexico border,could be taken with nothing but a rifle and two cannon.3 4
When Madero rejected the plan, Orozco with Villa's compliance
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had their revolutionaries exchange insults and then shots with
the federal troops on May 8, 1911.

Soon the .battle was im-

possible to stop, as the reyolutionaries dynamited their way

from one building.to another until the city surrendered. The
federal loss of Juarez to insurgents shook Mexico and encouraged the Zapatistas to seize
City.

Cuau~la,

just south of Mexico

On May 21, 1911, the Zapatistas occupied Cuernavaca,

the capital of the state of Morelos, and soon federal troops
were retreating from Morelos.

And.on May 24, rumors circu-

lated throughout Mexico City that D!az would soon re$1gn. As
crowds gathered, D!az did resign and boarded a German ship
sailing for Europe.
D!az gave Madero the battle, but deprived him of winning
the war.

Thus, Madero's victory was incompl~te.35 He would

not be able to consolidate the D!az bureaucracy and army
into a revolutionary programme, partly because those government structures were still wholly intact and partly because
those structures would soon be undermining whatever government and agrarian reforms he had intended in his "Plan of
San Luis Potos!."
The provisional incumbent government was led by De la
Barra, not Madero.

De la Barra appointed Juan Carreon, the

manager of the Bank of Morelos, to.the office of provisional
·governor of MorelosQ

Carreon sided with the hacendados (i.e.,

the hacienda owners) against the villagers and peasants.

The

first day Madero arrived victoriously in Mexico City, June 8,
1911, and again on August 13, 1911, Zapata asked that

Carre~n
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be replaced by a revolutionary governor favoring agrarian
reforms. Meanwhile, Carreon and hacendados disseminated
.fabricated accounts of depredations in Morelos by Zapatistas.
These accounts led De la Barra to order General Victoriano
Huerta to press the

campaign~into

ate or to disperse the Zapatistas.

Morelos either to eliminThus, instead of with-

drawing federal troops, as Zapata requested of Madero on
August 13, i911, Carreon's exaggerated accounts of chaos in
Morelos had the opposite effect on De la Barra, who used the
accounts to justify reinforcing

fe~eral t~oops.

Madero was·1naugurated on November 6, 1911. Instead of
withdrawing federal troops, he.offered to absolve Zapata of
the charge of rebellion in return for unconditional surrender
and exile from Morelos •. The hacienda Madero offered him was
rejected: Zapata opposed hacendados and did not seek to be
one.

Ultimately, his response to Madero was the famous Plan

of Ayala, which demanded popular government and agrarian reform.
As General Huerta pressed the fight against the Zapatistas, the hacendados saw their homes burned, their .haciendas
taken over and subdivided by peasants (i.e., their lands redistributed), animals stolen (i.e., redistributed), their
families killed, and towns razed.
had earlier

existe~,

Where prosperty (for a few)

desolation reigned {for the hacendados,

at least). ·rheir anti-Zapatista myth continued as the press
slandered the Zapatistas by claiming they were guilty of
"rape, rapine, pillage, and bri,gandage. 11 36

The citizens of

Mexico City read only what the hacendado press propagated.
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By the end of 1911, Orozco, bribed by rich cattle
barons in the north, revolted against Madero also.

Madero

gave the job of running down Orozco to General Huerta, who
was assisted by Pancho Villa.

Orozco's loyalty to Madero

had been freely given and therefore freely withdrawn.

But

Huerta and Villa disputed over a horse and Madero intervened.

11fe~ 7

Huerta had ordered Villa shot, but Madero saved v1i1a•s

Huerta was not to forgive Madero for intervening, because
soon the tide had turned against Madero.

The Zapatistas

by October, 24, 1911, had succeeded in assaulting M1lpa
Alta, just outside Mexico City, with several thousand
insurgents.

By May 22, 1912, Huerta, who had succeeded in

capturing Rellano from some 8,000 poorly organized Orozquitas, was no longer interested in being loyal to Madero.
In October of 1912 Felix D!az, the nephew of the former
dictator, revolted, but even after his capture and imprison-·
ment, he was able to conspire to revolt again.
Felix D!az was aided by General Bernardo Reyes in
plotting against Madero in 1913, when officers from the
army freed Felix D!az and marched on the National Palace
in what is commonly called the "Ten Tragic Days...
were met by burst of machine
and 200 others.

gun;~

They

fire, which killed Reyes

Madero, sealing his own doom, called on

General Huerta to command the palace troops.
Meanwhile, Henry Lane Wilson, the

u.s.

Ambassador,

sought to use his influence to bring order to Mexico.

He

•

I
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conv.inced several foreign diplomats .and Mexican senators that
Madero ought to resign and General Huerta ought to form a
military dictatorship.

Huerta took Madero into custody and

then Madero was assassinated.

Huerta proclaimed himself

provisional president.
The conservative governor of Coahuila, Venustiano
Carranza, denounced Huerta after the assassination of Madero.
Soon Carranza's righteous cause found supporters: the forces
under Alvaro Obregon in Sonora; Villa and Pablo Gonzalez in
the north; and Zapata, who had

b~en

an ant1-Huert1sta since.

as early as August of 1911, in the south.
anti-Hueristas were Villa and Zapata.

The most ardent

Huerta sought and

got the loyalty of Orozco, who made five demands, including
federal pay for his irregulars.

Having met with success

with Orozco, Huerta sent negotiators to

Z~pata

with the same

conditions for an alliance, but Zapata would never ally with
Huerta.
Huerta, fearing that governors might ally with
Governor Carranza, began replacing them one by one. But
this policy backfired and inadvertently drove ex-governors
and their supporters into arms against Huerta.

Perhaps

Huerta would have been able-to direct sufficient military
force against the Constitutionalists under Carranza in the
three northern states and next against the Zapatistas in
Morelos to effect an overwhelming victory -- and thereby
brought peace and order to Mexico that Ambassador Wilson
had envisioned -- if it had not been for isolated rebellions
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breaking out in thirteen other states by the summer of 1913.
Each insurgent outbreak drew strength in troops and demanded
more supplies.
Huerta sent General Robles, a Huertista career officer,
into Morelos in May 1913.

Robles arrested and expelled the

anti-Huertista governor and legislators of Morelos. He then
razed villages suspected of harboring

Zapatist~s,

took

hostages and sometimes executed them, and herded thousands
into resettlement camps in other states.

Robles, however,

soon found out that he could control only the larger towns.
Zapata was master of rural Morelos ...
By late September 1913, Villa began a vigorous campaign in the north, where he forced a federal surrender at
Torreon, taking 116 valuable artillery pieces, and executing
all captured federal officers.
who re·signed.

This defeat stunned Huerta,

Then Carranza made an attempt to rid himself

of Villa, who became enraged.

Villistas were loyal to Villa

first and only then loyal to the Constitutionalist Movement~8
Carranza, since he had been a governor under D!az and
was pro-hacendado, was not the sort of ruler that either
Villa or Zapata would obey.

Rende, neither Villa in the

north nor Zapata in the south would consider Carranza the
legitimate provisional president.

Thus, Carranza -- like

Madero and Huerta before him -- failed to end the revolution.
Meanwhile, Obregon convinced Carranza to leave the
forming of a new Mexican government to a Convention at
Aguascalientes.

In October 1914, delegates there soon
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discovered that Villa was boss.

Indeed, Eulalio Gutierrez,

the provisional president elected by the Convention, found
himself a virtual prisoner of Villa's.

But Gutierrez soon

escaped to Carranza, who was in Vera Cruz·.

Villa entered

·Mexico City with his troops in December 1914 and sent word
to Zapata to join him there.

Villa, the fat revolutionary,

and Zapata, the trim· revolutionary, met.

The Villistas had

supported the Plan of Ayala at the Convention, so the two
insurgent leaders were in agreement as to their revolutionary aims: popular

governm~nt

and agrarian reform.

However,

the Mexican Revolution was not to e·nd in December of 1914.
Carranza sent federal troops under Obreg6n to drive
Villa from Mexico City.

The Villistas retreated and on

April 6, 1915, Obregon defeated Villa at Celaya, where
12,000 lives were lost.

WLth Villa on

~he

Carranza turned his attention to Zapata.

run to the north,
By late summer

1916, Carranza sent General Pablo Gonzalez into Morelos
with 40,000 troops.

These troops tortured and mutilated

and executed unarmed peasants.

They raped women, sacked

towns, burned villages, deported natives to other parts of
Mexico, and destroyed crops, animals, and implements of work.
All civil guarantees were suspended.39
Zapata had to refine his guerrilla tactics.

He laid

traps and ambushes, cut supply lines, stormed towns, and
generally destroyed small federal units and harassed larger
federal forces.

Whenever Gonzalez divided his forces, he

exposed them to ambush and assaults.

.

I
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In June and August of 1916 Carrancistas killed 466 men,
women, and children in Tlaltizapan, Morelos, where Zapata
had his headquarters.

The .Carrancistas returned again in

1917 and 1918 to raid Morelos, killing peasants, burning
crops, driving off cattle, spreading misery and hunger. The
federal troops even destroyed the sugar mills by carrying_
off the mill machinery to Mexico City, where they sold it
for scrap iron.

Of the 70,000 Zapatistas with Zapata in

1915, only 10,000 remained by 1919.4o
One of Gonzalez's officers, Jesus Guajardo, was out
to get the reward being offered for .the head of Zapata.

He

simulated desertion from the federal army by attacking his
own fellow Carrancistas in Jonacatepec.

When Zapata heard

of the desertion, he sought out his new ally, because to
Zapata with a dwindling force more allies were needed.
On April 10, 1919, Guajardo ambushed Zapata.

He and

his men riddled the body of Zapata with bullets when Zapata
entered the hacienda Chinameca at Guajardo's invitation.
Carranza promoted Guajardo to general and rewarded him with
50,000 pesos.

The

assassinatio~

of Zapata crushed the

Zapatista Movement •. which never again gained strength •. The
impact of the assassination was so great that the heart of
the Movement had been lost.
Zapata's assassination, however, was not the only
assassination of a key revolutionary leader during the
Mexican Revolution.

Madero had been assassinated in 1913,

Carranza in 1920, Villa in 1923, and Obreg6n in 1928.
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As a model of revolution, the Mexican Revol~tion
provides the following criteria:

(1) The dictatorship of

D:!az had provided stability through loyalties of th.e army,
the Church, the bandit chiefs, and political bosses.

(2)

The bureaucratic and military structure did not fall when
the dictator went into exile.

{3) Habits of obedience

were towards a revolutionary leader, and then to the state.

(4) Loyalty freely given was often freely withdrawn.

(5)

Peasant revolutionary leaders like Zapata and Villa were
frustrated by the bureaucratic an4 military structure that
remained basically pro-hacendado.

'(6) As a prolonged revolu-

tion, the Mexican Revolution was a series of revolutionary
situations.

(7) Insurgents continued to challenge the

state as long as their aims were not recognized and as long
as they did not recognize the legitimacy _of the prohacendado state structure.

(8) Only when overwhelming use

of force was used against the insurgents did such force have
effect.

(9) The' plurality of assassinations in the Mexican

Revolution indicates that assassination was. considered an
effective use of incumbent power or insurgent· powero

(10)

The· hacendados propagated an anti-Zapatista myth from early
in the Mexican Revolution in order to ensure that the
bureaucratic and military structure would protect them. And
(11) The price placed on Zapata's head was in effect a
sentence of death in absentia~1 The impact of the assassination is difficult to measure, since the morale of his troops
was

low in 1919 at the time he was assassinated.

3l-

c.

The Spartacist Rebellion of 1919.
By December

1915, the Imperial German armies were

bogged down on the western

~ront

and Germany's two top

military leaders, General Hindenburg and General Ludendorff,
admitted defeat.

Together they convinced the Kaiser,

Wilhelm II, that an immediate armistice and an immediate
change in Germany's political system (a change favored by
President Wilson of the United States) must occur.
The major party groupings in that political system
were: the Right, a middle
comprised the

group,~and

Cons~rvatives and.th~

the Left.

The Right

Reichs Party (i.e.,

the Junkers, court society, and landowners); the middle
group comprised the National Liberals (i.e., big business)
and the Center Party {i.e., the Roman Catholics); and the
Left comprised the Progressives (1.e., the intelligentsia
and certain radical banking and commercial circles) and the
strong Social Democrat Party (i.e., the party of labor and
trade unions).
The loyal Social Democrat- Party (SPD) remained
supporters of the government during the war, while a small
"International" .group -- led by Rosa :i;.,uxemburg of the
Spartacists, i.e., a pro-marxian party -- by 1916 had
moved out of the ranks of the loyal SPD and agitated openly
against the war and for revolution.
Since Prince Max von Baden was acceptable to the SPD and
his liberal views towards labor well-knoWJ:}, he was asked to
form a new government as the Reich Chancellor.
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Prince Max then invited Friedrich Ebert, the leader of the
SPD to a conference, where the Prince suggested to· Ebert
the the Kaiser might abdicate if Ebert promised to have
the SPD, the largest party in the Re1chstag, wait before
undertaking radical changes.·· Ebert felt duty-bound to use
his leadership to save Germany.42
Meanwhile, the conservative Right sought to establish
a military dictatorship under a general.

The Spartacists

sought immediate radical changes, including the dictatorship of the proletariat. ·
On October 4, 1918, the SPD formed a coalition govern. ment.

Prince Max forwarded a message to President Wilson

requesting an armistice on the terms General Ludendorff
endorsed.

And by October 28, 1918, a new constitution of

a parliamentary monarchy went into force.

But the parlia-

mentary monarchy did not last long, because ·some Center
Party members retreated from Right to Left and the transition from war to peace in the face of defeat and disintegration of the traditional legitimacy of the state was conducive
to

rebellion, which broke out in November 1918.
On November 9, 1918, Prince Max announced the abdica-

tion of the Kaiser and he then resigned the Chancellorship.
His natural successor was Ebert, the leader of the majority
SPD.

"Soviets" -- i.e., Workers' and Soldiers' Councils --

had gained control of most urban centers, and were in the
process of self-creation throughout the country and at the
front.

Sailors had mutinied and civilians supported them.
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A general strike broke out in Berlin, where large groups of
armed workers and soldiers gathered.

The Spartacists in

Berlin encouraged the.strike and attempted to

procla1~

a

Socialist Republic, the same afternoon that Philip Scheidemann, Ebert's SPD cohort, had on his own initiative declared
a Democratic Republic.

Where no legitimate government

existed, any group could proclaim that it was as legitimate
as any other group to rule the state.
Army officers on the streets of Berlin had their
decorations torn off.

The red flag was hoisted on public

buildings, and hawkers suddenly wer.e everywhere selling red
rosettes, red ribbons, and red tags.

Prine~

Max, in one of

his last acts before leaving office, persuaded the Minister
of War, General Greener, to order his troops not to fire on
civilians.
Emil Eichhorn, a member of the coalition Independent
Socialists, became the Berlin Chief of Police in the wake of
the November Revolut.ion.
suddenly collapsed.
had been overthrown.

Monarchy throughout Germany had

Imperial Germany and the old regime
And the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers'

Council formally approved Eichhorn's appointment.
the Independent Socialists (a minority amongst the

Later
~oalition

government) favored the Left, i.e., they.became supporters
of the Spartacist insurgency in Berlin towards the end of
December 1918, because of the new Democratic Republic's
suppression of a justified mutiny among sailors of the Berlin
Naval Division.

Since Eichhorn was an Independent Socialist
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and since the Independent Socialists under Georg Ledebour
had suddenly broken with the SPD coalition, the Prussian
government sought to dismiss him from the off ice of Berlin
Chief of Police.

The Democratic Republic intended to ensure

its monopoly of power over Berlin by a new appointment. The·
Spartacists gave Eichhorn immediate support after he refused
to comply.
Since.both Ebert and-the

Ministe~

of War, Groener,

opposed radical changes in Germany, Ebert -- with his slogan
of Order, Freedom, and Peace --

t~rned

to General Greener,

who could provide the most reliable armed force to bring
law and order to Germany.

Indeed, General Greener still

controlled all field armies.

The Ebert-Groener Pact was.

formed with specific demands being made by Groener in return
for his military assistance to the new provisional government.
These demands included: summoning a national assembly, disarming the

population, and abolition of all Workers•

civili~n

and Soldiers' Councils.

A secret telephone line connected

thereafter the Reich Chancellery to the High Command's
headquarters at S·pa.
able to.review the

On this line Ebert and Greener were

situ~tion

from day to day and thereby

exploit a determined use of effective force whenever necessary.
Ebert's first duty was to agree to the Allied armistice
terms and to authorize Erzberger to sign them.

In mid-

December the first Congress of Workers' and Soldiers• Councils
met in-Berlin.

I

The SPD had no doubt by then that the Congress

would decide in accordance with its wishes.

The Congress
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rejected an early proposal to invite Rosa Luxemburg and other
Spartacist leaders to their deliberations.

Published minutes

of the cabinet meetings of the SPD leadership prove beyond
question that Ebert invested a great deal of energy in
reducing the Councils to impotence by conjuring up "an
utterly profound threat of bolshevism. ·~ 43 The Congress soon
endorsed the SPD

pla~

with a 400 to 50 vote.

for elections to a National Assembly.
Rosa Luxemburg's ·reacted to the vote

·by identifying the National Assembly as "a counterrevolutionary fortificationragainst the rev~lut1onary proletariat.•#4
The anti-Spartacist propaganda spread by Ebert•s
office slandered the Spartacist leadership, even

sugge~ting

that Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were lovers.45 Rosa
was name-called "Red Rosa.n

And she reacted against the

counterrevolutionary efforts of Ebert and Groerier by demanding on December 14, 1918, in the Red Flag that the entire
adult male proletarian population be armed and that a revolutionary tribunal be installed nto try the two Hohenzollerns,
Ludendorff, Hindenburg, Tirpitz, as well as all counterrevolutionaries. 1146
The Spartacists, ejected from the seats of power, had
no recourse but to assert themselves in acts of force against
the incumbent government.

Yet they were unable to control

the adventurism, rioting, street fighting, looting and other
excesses carried out by the Lumpenproletariat during. the
months of December 1918 and January 1919.

The Spartacists
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did attempt to stop the flood qf anti-Spartacist propaganda
1~

the press by seizing newspaper offices in Berlin.

The

incumbent government, however, held the upper hand in all

negotiations over those offices.
carrying white flags were

ev~n

And Spartacist negotiators

shot at.

The Spartacists, backed into a corner, had no choice
but to open relations with Joffe, the Soviet ambassador in
Berlin, who.provided them with money, leaflets, and arms.
·The Spartacists merged with the German Communist Party and
became known as KPD by the end of December.1918.
The· first incidents of violei:ice between Spartacists
and the incumbent' government was on.· December 6, 1918, when
a posse of noncommissioned ofrioers raided the headquarters
of the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Councils and arrested
(and in some oases executed key Spartacists) many of
the Councils' leaders.

Wels, the military commander of

Berlin and himself a SPD, called out loyal troops and roped
off all approaches to the inner city of Berlin.

The incum-

bent government was determined to teach the Spartacists a
lesson.
By

January 1, 1919, the Independent Socialists had

resigned from the provisional government's coalition in
protest to the suppression of the People's Naval Division
in Berlin.
Command.

They denounced Ebert as a lackey of the High
Gustav Noske, the Governor of Kiel during the

November naval mutiny there and himself a SPD, became a
member of the new provisional government's leadership. He

volunt·eered to organize loyal troops- -- including Free Corps
units under former officers of the Imperial Army -- to
smash the Spartacists in Berlin.
On January

5, 1919, the Independent Socialists and

the KPD Spartacists published a joint manifesto denouncing
Eichhorn's mistreatment at the hands of Ebert, Scheidemann,
and the Prussian Ministers.

Masses of workers had demon-

strated in front of Eichhorn's headquarters and he urged
them to insurrection in an inflammatory address•

Eichhorn's

sympathies were influenced by.Joffe, who was asked to leave
Germany by Ebert's government and who was caught with
discriminatory leaflets in his baggage.47 The issue of
Eichhorn's dismissal unified various Left factions, including.
the Shop Stewards, who were in favor of revolution.

Their

joint Proclamation declared:

.

;
I

Attention! Workers! Party Comrades! The Ebert- Scheidemann government has heightened its counterrevolutionary activities with a new contemEtible conspiracy directed against the
revolutionary workers of Greater Berlin: it tried maliciously
to oust Chief of Police Eichhorn from his Q&fice. It wished to
replace Eichhorn with its willing tool ••••
Since the crowds were large, the Left leaders felt ensured
of mass support.

But the next morning they were to discover

that loyalty freely given can be freely withdrawn.
If violent revolution was ever to succeed in Germany,
Karl Liebknecht reasoned, it must be now.
was reluctant and wanted to hold back.

Rosa Luxemburg

But Liebknecht went

ahead and formed a Revolutionary Committee and called on the
workers to rise in rebellion.
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By the next morning, however, the only groups.determined to take an active role in the rebellion were a small
number of Eichhorn's personal followers, a few thousand
KPD Spartacists, and sections of the Independent Socialists
and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards.

The Berlin Naval

Division had suddenly discovered its oath of loyalty to the
incumbent government binding.

By the evening of January 6,

the revolutionary action that had begun with such passionate enthusiasm was a miserable failure in terms of numbers.
The Spartacists ought to have known that the strong
habits of obedience of the common German civilian -- worker
or non-worker -- were rigidly authoritarian and submissive.
Moreover, the average German wanted only peace after years
of war, suffering, hunger, and misery.
Gustav Neske, the SPD Reichstag

Dep~ty,

sought to

re-establish order in Berlin by first surrounding the center
of the city and then attacking the Spartacist strong-holds.
Berlin soon became a bloody battlefield as machine gun fire
was exchanged.

The Spartacist Rebellion lasted but seven

days, from January 5 to January 12, 1919.

The police head-

quarters was the last insurgent strong-hold to fall.
After the arrival of the bulk of Noske's forces, a
cleanup operation began that was aimed at disarming civilians
by confiscating any and all unauthorized weapons.

The

Spartacist leaders became major targets as the Free Corps
distributed leaflets to its troops calling for the elimination of all communist leaders, including Rosa Luxemburgo 49

39These leaflets, sponsored by the incumbent government, were
in effect a sentencing to death in absentia of Rosa Luxemburg.·

She was finally captured and brought into the head-

quarters of one Free Corps unit in the center of Berlin and.
struck over the head with a rifle butt.

She was then carried

to a car, shot in the head, and her body dropped from a
bridge into a canal, where it was found weeks later.
The Ebert government announced by the end of January
that casualties were in excess of a thousand and that the
Spartacist Rebellion was smashed.

The assassination of

both Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were also announced,
but only after their movement was slandered and their proBolshevik sentiments overly .., stressed. The obvious intent
of such anti-insurgent propaganda was to make the assass1na tions seem morally righte.ous acts.
Philip Scheidemann in his Memoirs speaks of the
Spartacist Rebellion as "the Bolshevist reign·of terror".
He describes the Spartacist insurgents as "Lunatics" and
"Russian agents": "Lunatics were let loose, and Russian
·agents o" 51 Captain Horst von Pflugk-Hartung, who had shot
Karl Liebknecht, took pride in

~reeing

Germany of Bolshe-

vism by his act.5 2 There can be no doubt that the EbertScheidemann incumbent government made maximum use of the
historical facts of Bolshevik terror and violence in Russia
against the Spartacists.
by

The fact that one Right wing group

the end of December 1918, had put a price on Rosa Luxem-

burg's head meant that hired killers would seek her out.53
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Placing the blame of the assassination on the incumbent
government and assessing the impact of the assassination of
Rosa Luxemburg on the success of the Spartacist attempt to
turn the German Revolution of 1918 into a proletarian revolution of 1919 are two issues· open to debate.

Part of the

blame must be placed on the incumbent government, which {l)
stressed the bolshevik character of the

Spart~cists,

(2)

condoned the placing· of a price on the heads of Rosa and Karl
Liebknecht, (J) instrumentally distributed leaflets calling
for the elimination of Spartacist.leaders, and (4) feared
reprocussions after the assassinations.

Obviously, the

putting of a price on the head of Rosa· Luxemburg unleashed
bands of hired killers in search of her.

Full responsibi-

lity ought to be placed on the Right wing group that put up
the money.

But the incumbent government's leaflets calling

on the elimination of Spartacist leaders such as Rosa Luxemburg made the incumbent leaders instrumental in providing
the direction of its effective use of force.
Rosa Luxemburg was a strong leader of the Spartacists.
She was the "mind" of the Spartacist Movement.54

She had

been an active and vocal member of the International.-

Her

critique of capitalism, The Accumulation of Capital, was
regarded as a sequel to Karl Marx's Das Kapital.

She had

formulated the Spartacist's "demands" in her editorial in
Red Flag, "What Does the Spartacus League Want?"

And she

had been one of the first proletarian leaders to recognize
the role of strikes.

Her loss had more than a little impact.

CHAPrER II

COMPARISONS
A. Anaiysis.

With the fall of French Emperor Napoleon III, with
the fall of Mexican dictator Porfirio Diaz, and with the
fall of Kaiser Wilhelm II 9 the habits of obedience of the
respective subjects weakened because of the .similar
absoluteness of coercive power held in the hands of these
respective rulers.

As rulers with a monqpoly of power in

their respective countries, they were able to command
obedience and loyalty through fear and coercion.

The

· sudden fall of each ruler left an absence of charismatic
leadership with authority to rule.

The result was a degree

of lessening of obedience to respective provisional states
which depended on habits of obedience for its loyalty, since
each ruler had fallen after a defeat in war that somewhat
disintegrated its ability to use coercive weapons of force.
Thus, the political vacuum that resulted after Napoleon III
and most of his army were captured by the Prussians, that
resulted after Don Porfirio abdicated and left for exile in
Europe, and that resulted after the Kaiser had gone into
exile in Holland left each respective country without a
legitimate ruler with legitimate authority to rule the state.
Thus, socio-political change ·depended on new loyalties.
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Defeat in war left the French army in 1870 and the
German army in 1918 disintegrated, while the defeat in war
at the battle of Juarez did not disintegrate the Mexican
army•

Ho~ever,

the habits of obedience of Mexicans ·were·

not as much towards the state after D!az went into exile
as loyalties were towards individual revolutionary personali tes, such as Zapata and Villa.

The elections to the

National Assembly in France split the loyalties between
monarchists.:-favoring peace with Prussia and republicans
in urban centers seeking a Republic rather an an Empire.
And the collapse of the German army in World War I left
Germany in the hands of the Social Democrats, who favored
a monarchy and who needed the support of the Imperial
to maintain law and order.

ar~y

Because of the strong habits of

obedience of the German military, Germans generally were ·
obedient to the will of the· state, regardless of whether
it was legitimate in commanding that obedience.
The absence of a strong ruler in each respective state
meant that whatever habits of obedience were present in the
general population would be lessened as a result of the
socio-political vacuum and the lack of a state with any
legitimacy of authority to command obedience.

In such a

transitional vacuum arose revoluti'onary personalities with
autonomous wills.

Such personalities questioned the

legiti~

macy of the provisional government's authority to govern.
And these insurgent personalities found followers who were
suddenly free to switch loyalties, since loyalty freely

4J
given can be freely withdrawn.
Since the state lacked a monopoly of power,, suddenly
it found that it could not command obedience, 1.e., use
coercive power to intimidate.

Without fear, the insurgent

·rorces grew with the switching of loyalties.

But in the

case of the Mexican Revolution loyalties were often to the
bandit leader, if a member of a band of bandits, or to the
hacendados, if a member of a hacienda, or to the village
leader, if a member of a peasant

vi~lage.

Since the army

was not disintegrated by one battle, the Zapatistas of the
peasant villages of the state of Morelos found themselves
faced with federal troops seeking to disperse them.

The

provisional President of Mexico, De la Barra, appointed
Carreon, a pro-hacendado manager of the Bank of Morelos·, to
the office of provisional Governor of Morelos, Zapata had·
· reason to demand both political and agrarian reforms of
Madero, the revolutionary leader predisposed to reforms but
unable to command the obedience of the D!az bureaucracy,
which D!az had left essentially intact.

Thus, Zapatistas

remained loyal to Zapata and Villistas to Villa.
Of the three abortive revolutions, only the Mexican
Revolution was a case where the military remained basically
intact.

That the Paris Commune of 1871 could

~ot

have stood

a chance against the full military might of Napoleon III and
that the Berlin Commune of the Spartacists of 1919 could not
have stood a chance against the full military might of the
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Kaiser tends to place the stre.ss on the opportunity for
insurrection that opened up after the collapse of that
military might in the respective cases.

The rise of

charismatic revolutionary personalities -- such as Flourens
and Rosa Luxemburg -- with

th~

natural propensity to be

autonomous and to question the legitimacy of authority of
any provisional government corresponded with the rise 1n
opportunities for 1nsur.rection. · The switching of loyalties
freely given and freel.Y withdrawn was natural in the
respective transitions.

And the loyalty given Flourens

so freely before the sortie against, Versailles soon faded
after the first shots, just as the loyalty given Luxemburg
(not to mention Liebknecht) during the rallies in Berlin
soon faded by the time

Noske's forces surrounded Berlin.

Suddenly, the Naval Division found that it ought to remain
loyal to the provisional government, as did many of the
Germ.an workers -- the masses of proletarians who the Sparta!

!·

.
I

cists had counted on for support -- by the next morning
when they had time to consider whether they were for

peac~

freedom-order, i.e., the themes of Ebert's government~5
Establishing the legitimacy of authority of a new
incumbent state is as difficult as a given

revol~tionary

personality has in establishing his right to lead.

Much

depends on the strength of incumbent leaders to lead and
on their effective use of force against insurgent leaders.
The presumption behind assassination plots against the

stronger insurgent leaders is that their elimination will
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effectively control revolutionary situations.

The final
-

'

decision of incumbent leadership to assassination or to
eliminate those insurgent leaders is usually correlative
to the presumption that that decision would bring the
predicted results, i.e., control of change.

Indeed, the

incumbent wants control of change in order to protect itself
from insurrection, while the insurgent wants control of
change in order to overthrow the state.
I

By use of assassination the incumbent wants a
maximum amount of control of change and at the same time
wants a maximum.amount of uncontrol of change among the
insurgent forces: i.e., the elimination of an insurgent
leader with strong loyalties of his followers presumes that
the degree of control over the revolutionary situation he
possessed will thereafter be uncontrolled.

New leaders

with mixed loyalties of followers -- some freely given
and some freely withdrawn soon thereafter.-- will have to
struggle for leadership of the insurgent movement.

Such

presumption must have been foreseen by plotters among the
incumbent elite who sought the maximum amount of impact on
the insurgents by the most effective use of force.
Analysis of the descriptive content of the three
abortive

revolution~·

indicates that the three provisional

governments used coercive force both effectively and determinately.
Communards.

Thiers used coercive force to massacre 20,000
Carranza -- after.De la Barra, Madero, and

Huerta failed -- succeeded in using coercive force against
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the Zapatista insurgents and reduced their forces from
70,000 in 1915 to only 10,000 by 1919. And the provisional
government under Ebert used coercive force to ·kill about

a thousand pro-Spartacist rebels~
Analysis also

indicate~

that the respective incumbent

governments sought the elimination of key insurgent leaders •.
The Versailles government's military court sentenced Flourens
to death in-absentia. Carranza placed a reward on the head
of Zapata, which in effect sentenced Zapata to death in
absentia.

And Noske's troops distributed leaflets calling

:for the elimination:.·o:f Rosa Luxemb-q.rg, which was in effect
sentencing her to death in absentia.
After the assassination of these key insurgent· leaders,
the propagation of an anti-insurgent myth was needed to give
moral justification for the self-rigtheousness of these
assassinations and the death of so many insurgents.

The

anti-Zapatista myth began early in the state of Morelos·
where pro-hacendado news accounts fabricated
Zapatista deprecations.

The anti-Cornmunard myth. propagated

by Thiers began with the accusation of National Guardsmen
for the deaths of two government officers following orders.

And the ant1-Spartac1st myth propagated by Ebert and

pro~

incumbent newspapers -- many of them taken over by the
Spartacists in Berlin in order to stop the anti-Bolshevik
slander of key Spartacist leaders -- began during the war
when both Luxemburg and Liebknecht were jailed for protesting the war, and name-calling later, e.g., "Red Rosa."
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B. Conceptual Scheme.
1. An Explicit Conceptual Framework. The comparative

study of revolutions can either draw from the tradition of
similar studies (e.g., Crane Brinton's Anatomy of Revolution)
or seek an original path.

This thesis has followed the

traditional path because the reader is more apt to be familiar
with it.

The

nee~.

for a Conceptual Scheme such as Crane

Brinton provided is also stressed by Peter.Amann:
Me:x-ely ttreliving 11 the chaos "as it really was" is
unlikely to provide such an understanding (i.e., "a rational
understanding of the dynamics of a revolution"). Actually.
though the advocates of Rankean detachment also want to draw
conclusions and discover patterns, they feel that they can
do this without bringing to their study any conceptual
apparatus at all--merely a healthy curiosity and the canons
by which they were trained. I believe that they are deceiving themselves. The real alternative lies between a conceptual framework which is never made explicit and therefore
remains beyond the rea~ of· criticism, and one which is open
to critical inspection.
Brinton sought scientific "detachment" b:ut also provided an
explicit Conceptual Scheme based on facts drawn from empirical phenomena to support

hypothese~

of first approxima-

tions of uniformities.
In the next sections an explicit conceptual framework
I

i .

will

ble11d

the notion

of

"habits of obedience"· in Am.arm's

"redefinition". of revolu·tion with the notion of the distinc-

tion between autonomy and authority in Robert Paul Wolff's
In Defense of Anarchism.

Hopefully, such a blend will.

provide the sort of general identification of the moral
state of mind common to the.revolutionary personalityi i.e.,
the "revolutionary personality" can have a moral basis.
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2. The Revolutionari Personalitio

The conception of

the autonomous individual -- i.e., one who rejects all
authority as illeg1timate5~- ought to be of more than a
little historical interest to the student of revolution.
Doing what one is told to do-because another tells him is
not the basis for a rational moral foundation.

Some claims

of authority, such as the robber's, may be morally wrong.
For example·, if a robber holds you at gunpoint and says
"What is yours is mine," he has power over you, but hardly
authority over you.59
Men generally acknowledge claims of authority because
of the force of tradition.

But tradition to the revolution-

ary personality is usually an inadequate. reason to obey.

Yet

there does not exist a rational basis for legitimate authority
outside tradition.
Analysis of the three abortive revolutions indicate
that strong rulers -- Napoleon III, D!az, and Kaiser Wilhelm
II -- fell.

just before the revolutions took place.

Habits

of obedience determine how that transition effected each
respective state.

If the habits of obedience are strong (as

in the case of the Germans), then the transition is smooth.
But if the habits of obedience are weak (as in the case of
the Mexicans), then the transition is· roughc

Indeed, after·

a strong ruler has fallen, generally only another strong
ruler can take his place, 1.e., if a ruler must be strong to
command obedience in a given state.

The disintegrati_on of

the respective armies after defeat in war also weakens the
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coercive force available to the respective strong rulers and
of course to the surrogate rulers who:replace them.

When the

I

surrogate ruler replaces a strong ruler, a momentary break•

!·

down of the state's monopoly of power is likely to occur,
because the autonomous revolutionary personality -- who
rejects all claims to legitimate authority and would not
believe such a claim if it were made by a surrogate ruler
capitalizes on "a lessening of the habit of obedience" that
naturally arises during such transitional transfers of power.
Autonomous insurgent leaders -- such as Flourens,
'
Zapata, and Luxemburg -- called into
question the legitimacy

of the respective incumbent governments led by surrogate rulers.
In other words, they challenged the new rulers, who lacked a
monopoly of power, who lacked unquestioned obedience, and who
lacked legitimacy of authority (at least in the eyes of the
autonomous insurgent leaders). · As Peter Amann points out,
Obedience based on loyalty independent of habit or fear
is, as Machiavelli saw, an insecure basis of gtate power.
Loyalty freely given may be freely withdrawn. 0
The lack of strong loyalties to a given surrogate incumbent
ruler lessens the habits of obedience to the state.

As Amann

maintains, "the power monopoly of the state depends largely •••
on their (i.e., the governed) habits of obedience":
It is the habit of obedience that, extended to institutions like the army and the:.:bureaucracy, makes it possible for
the state to delegate vital functions without jeopardizing its
own effective monopoly of military, judicial and administrative power.61
The strong habits of obedience, _f9r example, of the Germans
made such power responsible and obedient to Ebert himself.

I.

i
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J. A "Redefinition" of Revolution.

If the term "revo-

lution" is a semantic device, then the pragmatics of what is
the best available definition to use within a conceptual
scheme will determine appropriateness.

Neither Brinton's

common usage, nor Hobsbawm's vacuous open-ended definition
of revolutionary situation, are adequate.

Brinton's defini-

tion is too broad, while Hobsbawm•s definition depends on
a definition of "success" and "good chances of a revoluti·onary outcome."

And the "circular motion" of the Copernican

idea of revolution in the astronomic sense is inadequate.
Peter Amann proposes

~o

"redefine .. the term as "a

breakdown, momentary or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of
power, usually
o~edience."

acco~panied

by a lessening of the habit of

The revolution lasts until· the state's monopoly

of power is se.riously challenged by one or more "power blocs."
And it ends when either the incumbent leadership or the insurgent leadership is victorious.

In other words, the insur-

gent forces succeed in establishing state power or its equivalent as in the case of a successful revolution, or the incumbent forces smash the insurgent forces as in the case of
an abortive revolution.
The selection of a definition appropriate to abortive
revolutions must include the possibility of a "momentary"
breakdown of the state's monopoly of power.

Though the Paris

Commune and the Spartacist Rebellion were in both cases smashed within a week of bloody street fighting, a week must be
considered to be a momentary existence ·of revolution.
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4. Historical Fallacies.

No broad, general claims are

made in this thesis, which aims only at primarily seeking
tentative uniformities through comparative analysis of three
revolutions and at secondarily refuting four general claims.
The three abortive revolutions, for example, suggest that the
general claim that all successful revolutions are inevitable
is unhistoric and that the general claim that all successful
revolutions are uncontrollable is self-contradictory.

If,

as Hobsbawm maintains, the term "revolution" can only be
defined in terms of "success," -- a term which he himself.
leaves open -- then abortive revolutions are not revolutions
at all.

Are abortive revolutions merely "revolutionary situ-

ations"?

A _revolutionary situation, Hobsbawm says, is a

short-term or long-term crisis with the possibilities of a
revolutionary outcome.

He implies by revolutionary outcome

-- if failure can _only be defined in terms of success -- a
successful revolutionary outcome.

And by success he seems

to seek something more than merely the establishment of state
power or its equivalent.

Obviously, abortive revolutions do

come within the scope of his classification of revolutionary
situation.

But it is arbitrary to ignore abortive revolu-

tions when he claims that this is the epoch of only successful revolutions.

Hobsbawm has made a fallacy of semantical

distortion in his argument, or a fallacy of composition in
his explanation, or perhaps both, when he makes such general
claims of such a universal, unlimited nature that any
abortive revolution is adequate to refute them.

~iven
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The semantic distortion in Hobsbawm•s. use of the term
"revolution" might be due to the use onty of the great
successful revolutions as models, which in turn provide the
criteria to classi:fy all such events.

But such a.··great

successful revolution as the Prench Revolution fails to
provide the ultimate criteria for defining the term.
fails because (1) historians draw upon enough

It

possible

factors as the cau.se that entirely different sets of causes
have been given; (2) historians.disagree as to whether it
was one or more revolutions, e.g., the Revolution.of the
Aristocracy, the .Revolution of the Third Estate, -the Demoer.a.tic and Republican Revolution of August 10, 1792, the
Social Democratic Revolution of June 2, 1793, and the Babeuf
Revolution during the Directory; and (3) historians disagree
on when it ended, one group (Mathiez,

Tho~pson,

Goodwin)

claim the French Revolution ended in 1794, while another
group (Lefebvre, Soboul, Richet) claim it ended in 1799.62
In terms of su.ccess even an abortive· revol_ution can
later have consequences leading to

success~

as Brinton point_s

out:
The abortive revolution is especially important in the
welding together of oppressed nationalities, which after a
few heroic uprisings attain a pitch of exalted patriotism and
self-pity that makes them almost unbeatable.63
The term "revolution" means more than just "chan.ge,u as even
Hobsbawm implies when he criticizes two definitions of the
term with only the term "change" in common.64 Moreover; he.

~ays· 11 analysis is not predictive 11 65 but that revolutions are
11

1n1t1ally" more "uncontrollable, 11 66 which ls predictive.
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c.

Thesis Argument.
1. Refutation of "little" Historical Interest Claim •.

Eric Hobsbawm claims that all approaches seeking to identify

revolutionary personality are of little historical interest.

By

explicitly rejecting the need.to identify revolutionary

personality, he has self-refuted his claim, because he has
indeed shown more than a little interest in claiming all such
approaches wrong.

As.a historian, he either· can present·

adequate evidence to·· warrant his cl.aim, or he cannot.

I:f he

cannot, then his claim lacks support and can therefore be
discounted as not a claim at all.

An unsupported claim is

not a strong objection to all such identification approaches.
For Hobsbawm to be persuasive, he must support his
claim.

By supporting it, he self-refutingly shows more than

a little historical interest in identifying revolutionary
personality.

Thus, his approach becomes a kindred approach.·

Categorically, his approach (i.e., supporting with more than
a little interest the rejection of all approaches that seek
to identify revolutionary personality) is nevertheless an
approach to revolutionary personality.

He refutes himself:

All approaches are wrong.
Hobsba.wm• s approach is such an approach.
Therefore, Hobsbawm's approach is wrong.
Since he rejects revolutionary personality as being of little
historical interest, he must have good reason.

Marxism ls

often considered to be a repudiation of the role and significance of the individual in social development, although Marx
himself was a humanist, 1.e., man was not nameless and.impersonal.
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2. Refutation of the claim that revolutions are both
uncontrollable and inevitable.

Hobsbawm contradicts himself

by maintaining that "some revolutions are avoidable, if
avoided, 11 67 and at the same time claiming that revolutions
-- i.e., successful revolutions -- are both uncontrollable
and inevitable.

For example,

All revolutions are unavoidable.
Some revolutions are not avoidable,
i.e., some revolutions are avoidable.
The semantic difference between "unavoidable" and both
uncontrollable and inevitable is significant only insofar
as any use of eff·ective force by an incumbent government to
protect itself from revolution aims at avoiding revolution.
During a revolution an incumbent government either controls
or not controls the revolutionary situation.

If the incum-

bent controls it, then the revolution fails.

Any of the

three abortive revolutions provides inductive support to
support the qualified suggestion that some revolutions are
controlled.

And, similarly, an incumbent government that

succeeds in controlling a revolution by smashing the insurgent forces avoids, at least momentarily, what chances the
revolutionary situation had of becoming successful. At- that
f
point in time the historian would be unhistoric to make any
claims concerning the inevitability of a predicted outcome.
Either a revolution is inevitable in time or it is not.

It

would be therefore unhistoric to predict a successful outcome of revolution before, during, or momentarily after an
abortive revolution.

Inevitability is unhistoric in time.
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3. Refutation of "Epoch of Social Revolutionn Claim.

I

II

That some revo.lutions are successful and that some revolu-

I

tions :fail cannot be denied·.

l

The existence of revolutions

in modern times cannot be denied.

Indeed, the existence of

revolutions in history provided the basis for the primary
comparative study of the 'uniformity of three revolutions
that failed.

But it is unhistoric to generalize about the

. future by claiming that all social revolutions are unavoidable, uncontrollable, and inevitable.

Hobsbawm contradicts

himself by making such universal claims of

m~dern

history:

No social revolution is avoidable (1.e., all social
revolutions are unavoidable) is contradicted by the fact
that some social revolutions are avoidable.
Success is avoidable.

Unfortunately, success is not

inevitable in the affairs of man.
always be controlled.
might not happen again.

Indeed, success cannot

Moreover, what happened yesterday
Perhaps modern history up to now

has been an epoch of social revolution, but it would be
unhistori·c to predict the future will be like the past.
Three abortive revolutions inductively refute the
universal claim that no social revolution is avoidable (i.e.,
controllable and not· inevitable).

Indeed, the three abortive

revolutions tentatively suggest that this is the epoch of
abortive social ._,
revolutions.

As models, abortive revolu-

tions provide the criteria or understanding necessary to
protect ourselves from successful revolutions tomorrow.

4.

Summ~ry

of Secondary

Argum~nt.·

The secondary pur-

pose of this thesis was to refute Hobsbawm's four claims.
These arguments of refutation do not aim to be conclusive.
However, the understanding of how to protect ourselves fr?m
revolutions -- i.e., the

sor~

of understanding that Brinton

sought -- may be better found in abortive revolutions than in
successful revolutions.

In the four revolutions that Brinton

studied, the respective incumbent governments failed to use
determined effective force against the insurgent forces.

In

the three abortive revolutions studied in this thesis, the
respective incumbent governments succeeded in using effective
force to smash the insurgent forces.

Hence, two distinc·t

types of models of revolutions can be focused upon: the
.abortive revolution model and the successful revolution model.
Hoosbawm's four claims depend on models that succeed, 68 if
he claims that the inevitability and the uncontrollability of
revolutions are universal.

But inevitability. of revolution

is found only after a successful revolution and uncontrollability ls found during a successful revolution, if at all •. Some
revolutions are avoided, controlled, and thus were not. inevitable.

Abortive revolutions were controlled by the effective

use .of force

by

the incumbent governments in the· cases studied.

From the study of abortive revolutions alone, one might
suggest that this is an epoch of abortive revolutions and
not an epoch solely of successful revolutions.

If abortive

revolutions become universal in the future, perhaps it will
be so because of understanding derived from abortive models.
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5. Assassination.

Historians who consider history as

biography find_ great interest in the personalities of
1. Archduke
2. Lincoln

J.

Ferdinan~

7. Leon Trotsky
8. Gandhi

,,

9. Rasputin°9

JFK

4. Malcolm X

5. Rev. Luther King Jr.
6. Dr. Marat

10. Rosa Luxemburg
11. Emiliano Zapata
12. Gustave Flourens

These individuals are not nameless and impersonal.
was murdered.

Each

And some were without a doubt political

murders, i.e., assassinations.

Hence, interest in assassina-

tions has more than a little relevance to historians and to
historical biographers.
In some abortive revolutions the incumbent government
uses effective force to smash the insurgents.

A part of the

effective force used may be the use of .assassination of key
insurgent leaders.

In each of the abortive revolutions

studied, the incumbent government used

assass~nation

of the effective force to smash the insurgents.

as part

In each

case evidence indicates.that the incumbent government sought
to eliminate key insurgent leader.

Such evidence,

h~wever,

provides only a possible.causal link between motivation and
assassination.

Such a link can also be regarded as a moral

one between cause and effect.
In

comparatiy~.historlcal.

study some factual evidence may

answer the question, ''How did it happen?"

The moral implica-

tions of such an answer sometimes answers the moral question,
"Who is to blame?..

The two different questions seem to merge

and demand a single answer.
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6. The Fallacy of Responsibility as Cause.
historical fallacies must be avoided.
the fallacy of

responsib~lity

Various

One such fallacy is

as cause, which occurs when

the causal question, "How did it happen?" seems to-:-have the
same answer as the moral question,

11

Who is to blame?''

When

these two different questions are merged and seem to demand
one answer, the fallacy is said to occur.
hoc?

Is it not post

It is not a post hoc fallacy to tie the causal evidence

of the incumbent government to eliminate the insurgent leaders
in each case, because such evidence is. tied to the evidence
of the effect, 1.e., the key insurgent leaders in each case
were eliminated by assassination.

Of course, one event is not

the cause of another event merely because it comes in temporal
succession before the other.
ated.

Who was to blame?

unanswered.

These key leaders were elimin-

The moral question must remain

But the causal question has been answered.

Suggestions, not claims, are tentatively put forward
in this thesis as. inductive generalizations limited by the
scope of the study, which is to three abortive revolutions.
Another fallacy, the fallacy of the single case, is therefore
avoided.

when it is suggested that no claims are here made,

such a statement, if made, ought not be taken as an insidious
claim.

Of course, over-generalizations that go beyond the

inductive generalizations within the scope of the study must
be considered unjustifiable, as

over-generalization tends

to distort the tentativeness and the limitations of scope of
the inductively limited uniformities the study supports.
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J_. Summarz of Argument. Just as it is difficult tJO

,.

assess the impact of assassination of a given leader on the

I

controllability of a given revolutionary situation by the

lI

incumbent state, so is it difficult to identify whether a
given revolutionary personality -- such as Gustave Flourens
-- had a high degree of control over the Paris.Commune. He
does provide an example of the sort of insurgent leader the
historian would have to identify and to assess.

If one

revolutionary personality proves the point that identification is of more than a little historical interest, the
example of Flourens will serve to prove the point.
The fact that marxists have found the Paris Commune to
be the best model for the establishment of proletarian power
allows us here to use Flourens as the best example •
. The assumption that the Versailles• incumbent government was motivated by the "presumption., that the ·assassination of Flourens would effectively protect the state must
be considered self-confirming, because the assassination
took place with the aim of controlling the revolutionary
situation.

To attempt to provide evidence pro or con to

this assumption would only confirm the counter-claim that
the approach seeking to identify revolutionary personality
has more than a little histor1ca1 interest.
If successful revolutions have been avoided (e.g.,
controlled by assassination of insurgent

leade~s),

_then

·revolutionary situations are controllable and. successful
revolutions are not inevitable.

1

\

I
CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing_argument is supported by the analysis
and comparison of descriptiye historical evidence to warrant
nine approximations of uniformities: {l) the presence of habits of obedience to a strong ruler, (2) who fell after defeat in war, and (J) a lessening of habits of obedience towards
the surrogate incumbent government ensued among insurgents; (4)
lessening of habits of obedience towards the incumbent government meant that autonomous leaders, who naturally questioned
the legitimacy of any state, would find followers; (5) the
incumbent government assumed that these insurgent leaders were
a threat to their monopoly of power, authority, or legitimacy,
as is indicated by a determined attempt by each incumbent government to eliminate key insurgent leaders, who (6) generally held
the loyalties -- at least temporarily -- of their respective
insurgent followers; (7) the effective use of determined force
by each incumbent government included (8) the presumption that
elimination of key insurgent leaders was necessary; and (9) an
anti-insurgent myth was needed by the victorious incumbent state
power to give moral justification for the righteousness of the
act of assassination as well as the overwhelming use of force
in smashing the insurgent forces in bloody encounter.

Finding

these tentative uniformities from inductive evidence was the
primary purpose of this thesis.

Since the study involves a
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comparative analysis of revolution, a conceptual scheme that
stressed the need for identification of revolutionary personality and the need for a ••redefinition" of revolution was
developed utilizing a ble,nd of Wolff·•.s distinction between
autonomy and

a~thority

and of Amann's redeftn1t1on of revolu-

tion in terms of loyalty and habits of obedience. The revolutionary personality was identifiable in each of the three
abortive revolutions •. The presumptive decision to assassinate the insurgent leaders entails that the incumbent's plot
was based on predictive

posslbili~y

that elimination of an

identifiable revolutionary personality would have an impact
on the insurgent's morale and a weakening·of insurgent's
habits of obedience to new leadership. The possibility

o~

a

leadership struggle among insurgents would weaken their threat
to the incumbent government.

In order to analyze whether

assassination had an impact involves the identification of
such revolutionary personalities, which become more than of
little interest to historians of revolutions.
The revolutionary personality is one who

~oes

not find

any claim to legitimate authority persuasive and who would
not believe such a claim if it were made.

Such an autono-

. mous individual is in direct conflict with whatever state
seeks to impose its will, i.e., demand obedience and use
coercive force if commands are not obeyed.
The redefinition of revolution in terms of fear,
loyalty, and habits of obedience blends well with the
conceptual apparatus used in the analysis of the three
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abortive revolutions, which prove that revolutionary personal1ty is of more than a little historical interest and that
revolutionary situations are controllable (if determined
use of effective coercive force is unleashed by the

incum~

bent.) All future-bound claims tend to be unhistoric, including the suggestion that analysis of revolutionary situations is not predictive.

To suggest that it is not pre-

dictive is to suggest that it would be historic if it were
possible to predict future possibilities.

But future possi-

bilities are not history (i.e., of. the past) and there'f'o.re
can be discounted as unhistoric, just as· the notion that
all revolutionary situations -- initially or otherwise -I

.

~

1

can always be contro·lled.
not controlled.

Some are controlled and some are

Some are avoided, as Hobsbawm grants, while

some are not avoided.
Hobsbawm ties "success" into his notion of "revolution,"

.
I·

j.

which allows for a refutation of his claim that "revolutions
are inevitable" and his correlative claim that "this is an
epoch of social revolution."

Successful ·revolutions are not

inevitable, any more than abortive revolutions are inevitable.
This is the epoch of successful revolutions as much as it is
the epoch of abortive revolutions.

The analysis of the three

abortive revolutions tends to show that revolutions can·be
controlled by the effective use of force, which can be decisive. Few historians would question
change is inevitable.

th~t socia~political

Incumbent elites who plot assassina-

tion presume that eliminating key leaders will

control~hange.
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